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Abstract
We identify conditions under which a bargainer makes inefficiently large (small) investments in search for information about the opponent's reservation price. The analysis starts with the observation that a player will invest too much (too little) if the opponent's expected payoff is decreasing (increasing) in the probability that the player gets information. We develop comparative static results about over-and underinvestment as a function of the efficiency and distributional properties of mechanisms, their dependence on search outcomes, and the nature of the trading problem. The results do not depend on any specific bargaining mechanism and are illustrated in several examples.
INTRODUCTION
The paper contributes a building block towards a formal theory of institutions by looking at a class of "haggling" (Coase, 1937) or "rent-seeking" (Tullock, 1980) costs.
Specifically, we identify conditions under which a bargainer engages in too little or too much search for information about the opponent's reservation value. Our conditions apply to any bargaining games, but are still surprisingly simple. The key trade off is that information acquisition has a surplus-increasing component as well as a rent-seeking component, and whether there is under-or over-investment depends on the relative size of these two components. Our main result is that a player will be willing to invest too much (little) to acquire information which, if he had it, would reduce (increase) the expected value of the opponent's payoffs. There is more scope for this if the pre (post) search mechanism is more (less) efficient, if the pre (post) search mechanism gives the opponent a higher (lower) share, and if the first best probability of trade in the pre-search trading problem are larger. For example, a player will invest too much trying to get a signal which would allow him to appropriate all surplus.
The search behavior modeled here would often be seen as "market research" and is subject to both regulation and subsidy. On one hand, there are limits to the information that may be collected and asked for, and on the other hand governments help market researchers by making certain types of information available. The central message of the paper is that one ought to pay attention to the bargaining power conferred by the information. To the extent that the information enhances the efficiency of trade, one would want the seller to gain some -not too much and not too little -bargaining power by becoming informed.
Broad evidence suggests that bargainers with better information about their opponents tend to achieve superior results (Busse, Silva-Risso, and Zettelmeyer, 2006; Richtel, 2008) . Perhaps because of this, purchasing agents spend more time preparing to negotiate than actually doing so (Bradley) , and some firms prohibit non-procurement employees from having contact with suppliers (Simester and Knez, 2002) . Such attempts to gather information, or raise the opponent's costs of doing so, are suggestive of the forces driving our result.
The paper has no close cousins, but contributes to knowledge in two areas. It is the first paper to go beyond a reduced form representation of bargaining costs incurred before the bargaining process and the first paper to look at the possibility of underinvestment as well as over-investment. The literature has offered reduced form models in which there always is over-investment (e. g. Tullock, 1980; Ashenfelter and Bloom, 1993 ).
In the area of pre-play information acquisition, it is the first paper to offer results that do not depend on a specific mechanism and the first paper to look specifically at bargaining. There are many deep works in this area, focused on different auctions (Cremer, Spiegel, and Zheng, 2006; , ultimatum games (Gehrig, Guth, and Levinsky, 2006) , and the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves scheme (Bergemann and Valimaki, 2002; Bergemann, Shi, and Valimaki, 2009 ). These papers give regions in which there will be over-or under-investment in information, contingent on a specific mechanism being played.
1 Our contribution is complementary and akin to comparative statics between mechanisms. We predict whether equilibrium will exhibit over-or under-investment as a function of efficiency and distributional properties of mechanisms, the way in which these depend on search outcomes, and the nature of the trading problem.
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We apply the results to several examples, each showing that two seemingly similar trading problems can lead to very different search behaviors.
After introducing the model and presenting the main arguments in Section 2, we look at the examples in Section 3. The paper ends with a brief discussion.
MODEL AND MAIN RESULTS
We are looking at a trading problem with a single object, one seller and one If the players bargain without gathering further information, they play the presearch mechanism which we will index by p (for prior). Appealing to the revelation principle, we will represent p by the corresponding incentive compatible direct mechanism. Under this mechanism the object is transferred with probability q p (c, v) , while the buyer pays the seller an expected amount a p (c, v) . So for a given (c, v) , the seller's expected payoffs are
while the buyer's expected payoffs are 
We assume that all these posteriors are atomless and for convenience also that they have the same support as f p (v) .
To maximize the transparency of the argument, we make two simplifying assumptions about the nature of search. First, to ensure that posteriors are common knowledge, we assume that the buyer observes the signals. Second, to avoid complications from search decisions being used to signal valuations, we assume that the seller decides on search before observing his own valuation. 3 These assumptions are discussed in Section 4.
If the seller observes y, the players bargain based on f y ( │y) and g p ( ), using the post-search mechanism indexed by (y). If the seller searches but fails to observe a signal, they play the pre-search mechanism. We make no assumptions about the relationship between the pre and post-search mechanisms, nor about the relationship between the mechanisms played after different search outcomes. We represent all these mechanisms by the corresponding incentive compatible direct mechanisms. So for the mechanism (y), the object is transferred with probability q y (c, v│y) , the buyer pays the seller an expected amount a y (c, v│y) , and the expected payoffs are
and
U(c, v│y) = -a y (c, v│y) + q y (c, v│y)v. (5)
Recapitulating, the sequence of events in each of our trading problems is as follows:
1. The seller makes a search decision e.
2. The seller and buyer learn c and v, respectively. They both learn the value (y) of any signal received.
3. The payoffs are distributed.
In equilibrium, the seller will select e o =Argmax EΠ(e), while the efficient search investments are e*=Argmax{EU(e) + EΠ(e)}. This motivates the following simple, but very useful, observation: Q. E. D.
In words, the seller will invest too much (little) if the buyer's ex ante expected payoff when the seller gets information is smaller (larger) than his ex ante expected payoff if the seller does not get information.
We now rewrite payoffs in a couple of ways to focus on how different components change as the seller gets better information. This allows us to associate these changes with properties of the pre-and post-search mechanisms, as well as the trading problem itself. The two angles give somewhat similar insights, but there are differences, and in any given application, one format may be easier to evaluate than the other.
By using the envelope theorem on the IC constraint, we can rewrite the expected payoff of a buyer with valuation v' when the seller observes a specific y' as
Taking the expectation over v' and y' allows us to restate Lemma 1 as 
(t). < ∫U(t c , v)dG p (t c ) -∑ Y ∫U(t c , v│t y )dG p (t c )μ(t y │v) (7)
While we have not specified how the mechanisms vary with information, we will look at several different scenarios. First, we might assume that information causes the expected probability of trade to be weakly larger.
This is not unreasonable if the mechanisms are more or less the same regardless of information (although we look at a counter-example in Section 3). One might also assume that information causes the expected payoffs to the lowest type buyer to be weakly larger.
E c U(c, v) ≤ E cy U(c, v│y). (A2)
This is stronger, but we would expect the low types to benefit most from the seller getting
is a very reasonable assumption in at least some economic settings. In any case, we have Finding 1: Given (A1) and (A2), the seller will under-invest.
Second, if the pre-search mechanism implements all trades with probability one, the left hand side of (7) is at most zero and we will get over-investment if the left side is positive.
So if
E c U(c, v) > E cy U(c, v│y). (A4)
we have Finding 2: Given (A3) and (A4), the seller will over-invest.
We can also use continuity to immediately get several comparative static type results.
Finding 3: Suppose there are two trading problems T1 and T2 which are identical in all but one of the four terms in (7). Under either of the following circumstances, (3.1) expected payoffs to the lowest type in the pre-search mechanism are higher in T2, (3.2) expected payoffs to the lowest type in the post-search mechanism are lower in T2, (3.3) the probability distribution of trade in the pre-search mechanism in T2 first order stochastically dominates that in T1, and (3.4) the probability distribution of trade in the post-search mechanism in T2 is first order stochastically dominated by that in T1, then, if there is over-investment in T1, there must be over-investment in T2 and there may be over-investment in T2, but not in T1. and the buyer's expected post-search share is smaller than the pre-search share
we have
Finding 4: Given (A5) and (A6), the seller will over-invest.
Similarly, if the post-search mechanism gives all surplus to the seller,
Finding 5: Given (A7), the seller will over-invest.
This would, for example, apply to trading problems in which search gives the seller perfect information and the right to make a take-it-or-leave-it offer.
Much like we did with (7), we can use (8) and continuity to get several simple comparative static type results. 
Proof: In terms of the marginal effects of search, (A8) and (A9) imply that

∑ Y β 1 (y)α 1 (y)∫μ(y│t)dF p (t) -β 1 (0)α 1 (0) = ∑ Y [β 1 (y) -β 1 (0)] α(y)∫μ(y│t)dF p (t) -β 1 (0)[α(0) -Eα(y)] < ∑ Y [β 2 (y) -β 2 (0)] α(y)∫μ(y│t)dF p (t) -β 2 (0)[α(0) -Eα(y)] = ∑ Y β 2 (y)α 2 (y)∫μ(y│t)dF p (t) -β 2 (0)α 2 (0) (9)
So the incentives to search are larger in M2.
Q. E. D.
In other words, under the stated conditions, the more efficient mechanism is associated with less over-investment or more under-investment.
EXAMPLES
More Scope for Over-investment when Pre-search Trade is Closer to Efficient.
We first illustrate the logic from Findings 3.3 and 6.1, that ceiling effects generate more scope for over-investment when the pre-search mechanism is closer to being fully efficient. To this end, we use the sealed bid double auction analyzed by Chatterjee and Samuelson (1983) to illustrate that the seller will over-invest if the first best probability of trade is sufficiently high. To this end we compare a "high probability" 
Using the notation that F() is uniform between v and v b , while G( ) is uniform
between c and c h , we can generalize Chatterjee and Samuelson (1983) The sealed bid double auction is thus not incentive compatible in the sense that the bids do not correspond to the underlying values. However, we will use Lemma1 on the incentive compatible direct mechanism implementing the same outcomes. We consider three cases, that the seller gets no news, bad news, or good news.
In the "high probability" game, if the seller gets no news, (9) and (10) In the "low probability" game, if the seller gets no news, the buyer's expected payoff is 9/1024 ≈.0088. Further, the buyer's expected payoff is 0 if the seller gets bad news and 18/1024 if he gets good news. So in this case the buyer's expected payoff is the same (9/1024) whether or not the seller gets information, implying that the latter neither over-invests, nor under-invests.
More Scope for Over-investment with more Efficient Mechanisms
We now illustrate Finding 7, if the pre and post-search mechanisms are the same, there is more scope for over-investment the more efficient this mechanism is. To this end, we contrast the "more efficient" mechanism identified by Myerson and Satterthwaite (1983) with a "less efficient" mechanism that lets each player make a TIOLI offer with probability .5. The priors, The "more efficient" mechanism is such that
and ∫∫{t v -[1 -F(t v )]/f(t v ) -t c -G(t c )/g(t c )}q α (t c , t v )g(t c )f(t v )dt c dt v = 0
If the seller gets no news, α = 1/3 and the probability of trade is 0 for v < ¼ In the "less efficient" mechanism each player makes a TIOLI offer with probability .5. If the buyer makes the offer, her expected payoffs will be 1/12 whether or not the seller has received any information. If the seller makes the offer, the buyer can expect 1/24, .587.., or 2/81 depending on whether the seller has received no information, good news, or bad news. So the buyer's expected payoffs when the seller does and does not search is ≈.0633 and .0625, respectively, implying under-investment.
More Scope for Under-investment if the Post-Search Mechanism is More Efficient
We now illustrate the logic from assume that the parties play the most efficient mechanism under the prior or if the seller gets bad news, but we contrast two mechanisms for the case in which the seller gets good news. The "more efficient" mechanism prescribes trade at the price 1, and the "less inefficient" mechanism has each player making a TIOLI offer with probability .5.
We proceed as in the previous example to find that the buyer's expected payoffs without search are .271, while they are .070 after bad news. After good news, the "more efficient" mechanism gives the buyer expected payoffs of .5, while the "less efficient" mechanism only gives 7/16. So the buyer's expected payoffs after search are .285 and .254, respectively, and the "more efficient" post-search mechanism gives underinvestment, while the "less efficient" mechanism gives over-investment.
Fully Informative Signals and TIOLI Offers Lead to Over-investment
We finally illustrate the force in Finding 6.4 that mechanisms allowing a better informed player to appropriate most or all of the opponent's payoffs give more scope for over-investment. Suppose that each player gets to make a TIOLI offer with probability .5
and that y = v such that the seller potentially gets complete information. If the buyer makes the offer, her expected payoffs are the same with and without search. However, if the seller makes the offer after search, the buyer gets zero payoffs. So the seller will overinvest.
DISCUSSION
The paper contributes to two literatures; it partially unpacks a class of bargaining costs and it addresses the question of pre-play information acquisition from a new angle.
We will discuss each in turn.
Costless ("Coasian") bargaining is a widely used and extremely convenient assumption in economic models. However, if bargaining costs are of non-trivial magnitude, this assumption blinds us to agents' attempts at designing institutions that economize on them. Informal theories of economic institutions long have argued for the central importance of concepts such as "haggling costs" and "rent seeking" (Coase, 1937; Williamson, 1975; Tullock, 1980) , both of which have received little explicit treatment in the more formal literature. Consistent with this, some observers feel that ideas are more likely to be used by others once they are "embalmed" in a workhorse formal model (Krugman, 1995, p. 27) . A possible contribution of the present paper is to provide a model of bargaining costs that is simple enough to be incorporated in larger models (Wernerfelt, 2010 ) and yet is consistent with standard assumptions.
The existing literature on pre-play information acquisition uses a "bottom up"
approach; assuming that a particular mechanism is used throughout, it looks for properties of the trading problem and the search process under which there will be too little, too much, or just the right amount of search. We have here taken the opposite, "top down", approach, by looking for efficiency as a function of properties of mechanisms, the way in which they depend on search outcomes, and the nature of the trading problem.
Our comparative static results are not as deep as those developed by the bottom up literature, but they do throw new and complementary light on the problem. Furthermore, our examples show that the results are sufficiently strong to identify important differences between seemingly quite similar mechanisms and trading problems.
The extensive form analyzed is subject to two critiques: The search decision does not depend on valuations and the outcomes of search are assumed to be publicly observable.
While these points are well taken, they are not universally valid. In some cases the objects of bargain are revealed very shortly before agreements have to be finalized, forcing the parties to investigate each others' "type" well in advance of knowing valuations (e. g. many labor services). In other cases opponents have to be asked or informed about information (e. g. if they are obligated to give out information on request or if a third party, such as a credit bureau has to inform them of any search activity).
Finally, there are cases in which only one signal is relevant and yet is of uncertain availability (e. g. an old expert opinion on an antique). We nevertheless admit that the critiques have significant force and we will now discuss how one can generalize the analysis in each of the two directions thus indicated The complicated way these mechanisms may depend on the players' information means that we cannot invoke the Fan-Glicksberg existence theorem, nor the second order conditions, without making very strong restrictions on the class of mechanisms used.
Instead, we can gain intuition by pursuing another approach. In most natural bargaining games, a( ) and q( ) are such that stronger players will find information more valuable; the subjective probability of trade is higher as are the marginal returns from making it happen. This suggests that both the efficient search strategy e* and the equilibrium search strategy e o are decreasing. However, since seller will want the buyer to think that he is weak, the buyer's ability to draw inferences about the seller's search intensity will lower his equilibrium incentives to search. So compared to the model analyzed in Section 2, we should here expect a greater tendency to under-invest.
Consider now an extensive form in which the seller's search outcomes remain his private information. Since the buyer's strategy in general will depend on the seller's beliefs, this causes issues with the Common Knowledge of Common Prior assumption. It is not clear that the current literature offers a good general solution to this problem.
However, in the present context, we can still salvage some results by restricting attention to mechanisms in which each player's bargaining strategy is independent of the opponent's information. While this is a strong requirement, it is met by many commonly studied mechanisms with a flavor of second price auctions and take-it-or-leave-it offers.
Beyond the two issues discussed above, a possible avenue for future research is to characterize different classes of mechanisms in a way that can sharpen the comparative static results. This might ultimately allow us to merge the bottom up and top down perspectives.
